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Pyramide égyptienne ou pyramide aztèque : quelle métaphore pour décrire l’architecture 
industrielle de la chaîne d’approvisionnement de l’automobile européenne ? 
Résumé 
Cet article s’interroge sur la description couramment mobilisée de l’architecture industrielle 
de  la  chaîne  d’approvisionnement  automobile.  Depuis  le  mouvement  de  désintégration 
verticale  des  années  1980s,  cette  architecture  est  représentée  à  travers  l’image  d’une 
pyramide. Implicitement, les auteurs ont en tête une pyramide égyptienne, très pointue à 
son sommet, très large à sa base. Nous montrerons que, si pyramide il y a, elle est plutôt de 
type aztèque : avec un sommet tronqué et laissant une place aux PME. Dans une première 
partie historique, nous expliquons les éléments qui ont conduit à l’architecture pyramidale. 
Dans la deuxième partie, nous soutenons que la métaphore égyptienne est plus trompeuse 
qu’éclairante. Dans un premier temps, nous soulignons que la mobilisation excessive de cette 
métaphore  finit  par  exclure  de  l’analyse  des  entreprises  stratégiques.  Ensuite,  nous 
présentons les résultats d’une étude réalisée auprès de 750 PME françaises* montrant que 
certaines PME accèdent encore directement aux constructeurs et que la hiérarchie des rangs 
est plus poreuse que ce qu’on pense. 
Mots-clés : modularité, architecture industrielle, automobile, chaîne de valeur, PME.  
 
Egyptian pyramid or Aztec pyramid: How should we describe the industrial architecture of 
automotive supply chains in Europe? 
Abstract 
This article questions a terminology that is frequently used to describe automotive supply 
chains’ industrial architecture. Since vertical disintegration became a trend in the 1980s, this 
architecture has been represented using the image of the pyramid. Implicitly, authors have 
had the image of an Egyptian pyramid in mind, one that is pointed at the top and broad at 
the base. We will demonstrate that even if pyramids are an appropriate image, in the auto 
industry the Aztec variant, with its shortened peak and room for SMEs, is more accurate. The 
paper’s first section – with its more historical focus – explains the birth of the Egyptian 
pyramid. The section 2 puts forward the idea that the Egyptian metaphor is more misleading 
than informative. We start by demonstrating that overusing this metaphor will ultimately 
exclude  a  number  of  very  strategic  companies  from  analysis.  This  is  followed  by  a 
presentation of the findings from a study of 750 French SMEs*, in which it is demonstrated 
both that some continue to maintain direct access to carmakers and also that the hierarchy 
of tiers comprising this supply chain features greater porosity than is commonly recognized. 
Keywords: modularity, supply chain, industrial architecture, SME, automobile. 
JEL: L23, L24, L62, O33  
Reference to this paper: FRIGANT Vincent (2011) Egyptian pyramid or Aztec pyramid: How should we 
describe  the  industrial  architecture  of  automotive  supply  chains  in  Europe?,  Cahiers  du  GREThA, 
n°2011-27. 
 http://ideas.repec.org/p/grt/wpegrt/2011-27.html. 
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“The supply base of today’s carmakers is structured like a pyramid. On top 
of the pyramid is the carmaker. Below the carmakers are a small number 
of Tier 1 suppliers that sell parts directly to carmakers. Tier 1 suppliers in 
turn purchase materials from Tier 2 suppliers, who purchase from Tier 3 
suppliers, and so on down the supply chain.” 




For  the  past  30  years,  automakers  have  relied  increasingly  on  outsourcing,  with  most 
observers agreeing that this has been accompanied by a strong trend towards vertical disintegration. 
At the same time, there is no real consensus regarding the industrial architecture associated with this 
organisation - a term referring in the present instance to the general architecture of the supply 
chains in question, hence to the structural composition of the firms that intervene in said supply 
chains (their size, productive specialisation, scope of activities, number and location of productive 
units, etc.) and to the interlinkages between different subcontractor levels
2. 
In the early 2000s, the outsourcing trend lent itself to two different interpretations. The first 
derived from a modular hypothesis (Fine, 1998; Sturgeon, Florida, 2001; Sturgeon, 2002: McAlinden 
et al, 1999; Veloso, Kumar, 2002) and was comprised of studies asserting that modularity-related 
developments would lead to a significant pyramidisation of supply chains, with several world-class 
suppliers capturing the lion’s share of the OEM markets that supply carmakers directly, a tier that is 
almost  exclusively  comprised  of  complex  modules  and  subassemblies.  Indeed,  many  empirical 
studies have demonstrated that disintegration following a “cascade effect” (Nolan, Zhang, Liu, 2008) 
has culminated in a restructuring of supply chain architectures, as witnessed by the emergence of 
mega-suppliers (Frigant, 2009; Klier, Rubenstein, 2008). Opposing this thesis, G. Herrigel (2004) has 
stated that 
“There are also a very large number of problems with the image of a completely modular 
automobile industry and hence obstacles to the emergence of the highly concentrated and 
vertically  integrated  component  industry  outlined  by  Sturgeon,  Florida  and  others  (…)  it  is 
possible to think that there continues to be a very robust space for independent small and 
medium-sized component production in these industries” (p. 49). 
The  present  article  returns  to  this  debate  and  in  its  bid  to  establish  a  new  inventory  of 
automotive supply chain architectures. This effort is justified for two reasons. 
·  Firstly, T. Sturgeon and R. Florida (2001) explain that modularisation is a process. When they 
wrote their paper, we are at the very beginning of this process. And we can suppose that a lag 
effect does exist. Automobile supply chain will become a modular-chain. At the same time, G. 
Herrigel  has  contested  this  point  with  the  argument  that  the  heterogeneity  process  is 
fundamentally destined to last. In this vision, in addition to module suppliers carmakers still 
need other suppliers, including small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Examining current 
industrial architecture should help us to verify this hypothesis (delay vs. process renewal).  
·  The second reason ties to the conclusion of an article written by G. Herrigel (2004), which 
asserted  that  strong  pressure  on  SME margins makes  them  particularly  fragile  in  times of 
economic slowdown. T. Rutherford and J. Holmes (2008) have also highlighted the fragility of 
                                                      
2The architecture of a supply chain is comprised of two closely related aspects: the industrial architecture, referring to this structure of the 
companies in question (and to their interlinkages) and the organisational architecture, referring to their modes of coordination (market, 
hybrid forms, relational mode, etc.). The present article focuses on the former aspect even as it, quite understandably, recognizes that both 
are interdependent.  Egyptian pyramid or Aztec pyramid: how should we describe the industrial architecture… 
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Canadian SMEs contending with mega-suppliers and carmakers’ strategies. The question here 
is whether the crisis of 2008/2009 has evicted a number of SMEs from automotive supply 
chains or, at the very least, pushed them further down the supply pyramid. 
This pyramid metaphor has more or less generalised as a way of describing automotive supply 
chains. It is a good starting point for our own thinking in this area. Implicitly, authors using this image 
are thinking about an Egyptian pyramid that is very pointy at the top and very broad at the base. This 
article, on the other hand, will demonstrate that even if the image of a pyramid is appropriate, surely 
it is the Aztec variant that is more useful - at least in the case of Europe – featuring a truncated peak 
and leaving room for SMEs. Indeed, the paper’s second section will focus on Europe and replicate 
findings from an original investigation covering 750 SMEs in France that worked for the automotive 
industry in 2010. This survey will allow us to ascertain whether SMEs have been relegated to the 
automotive supply chain’s second or third tiers while enabling discussion of issues relating to each 
tier’s level of porosity. 
Before this, however, the first section will adopt a historical perspective and highlight factors 
underpinning the pyramid architecture. The second section then shows in two ways that the Egyptian 
metaphor  is more misleading  than  informative. The  first  point  is that overuse of  this metaphor 
answer excludes strategic actors from analysis. The second presents findings from a study of large 
sample of French SMEs and confirms the aforementioned analyses. 
I. From flat hierarchy to Egyptian pyramid: the challenge for 
Western carmakers 
During the fordist era, the dominant industrial architecture of the western carmakers was a 
flat hierarchy (Fujimoto, 1999). It was constructed around the following tripod: 1) strong vertical 
integration; 2) reliance on many suppliers and above all subcontractors who tended to be small in 
size; 3) with the latter dominated economically and technologically by carmakers who made wide use 
of  multi-sourcing.  On  the  contrary,  the  Japanese  carmakers  had  already  built  a  pyramidal 
architecture (Shimokawa, 1994, Cusumano, 1989) based on: 1) significant outsourcing; 2) reliance on 
a  small  number  of  direct  suppliers  engaged  in  mono-sourcing  and  producing  complex  elements 
(subassemblies); 3) a pyramid driven by a size logic and populated by large first tier suppliers with 
SMEs tending to operate on tiers 2 and 3.  
The  late  1980s  and  early  1990s  saw  widespread  recognition  of  the  originality  of  Japan’s 
organisational  model  for  vertical  relationships.  Womack,  Jones  and  Roos’s  global  bestseller  The 
Machine  that  Changed  the  World  (1990)  contributed  strongly  to  the  model’s  popularity  by 
highlighting its performance and helping, among others outcomes, to convince Western carmakers of 
the merits of changing their supply chains. American and European manufacturers would henceforth 
try permanently to imitate the Japanese model - with such imitation efforts ultimately culminating in 
a form of hybridation (Boyer et al, 1998). Of course, it was this stage that spawned the DNA driving 
future changes in vertical relationships. 
1.1. Adopting the Japanese pyramid 
Thus, Western carmakers began to appropriate the Japanese model and tried to adapt it. 
Terms such as kanban, kaizen, lean manufacturing and codesign started to circulate in carmakers’ 
workshops and offices. Clearly, Western carmakers did not adopt absolutely everything and ended 
up taking an interest in different aspects of the paradigm with varying degrees of haste (Freyssenet 
et al, 1998; Boyer et al, 1998). In other words, each carmaker had its own way of appropriating the 
ingredients of a Japanese model that in any event does not really exist in a single form (Freyssenet et Egyptian pyramid or Aztec pyramid: how should we describe the industrial architecture… 
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al, 1998). All in all, there is no doubting the general interest in adopting different elements of the 
“model”. Moreover, on at least one point there was a consensus – the need to alter current vertical 
relationships, notably the industrial architecture. 
Carmakers committed to cut their vertical integration rates, something that would soon be 
viewed as involving the construction of a supplier hierarchy. The first step consisted of reducing the 
number of direct suppliers. Towards this end, the reliance on multisourcing began to be contested in 
people’s rush to generate economies of scale by concentrating on a shortlist of chosen suppliers who 
would be asked to do more than they had previously. Building a pyramid assumes, after all, that 
components  be  reaggregated  by  means  of  subassembly  purchases.  Yet  subassemblies  require 
suppliers  with  a  modicum  of  development  capabilities,  adding  in  turn  to  the  fixed  costs.  Such 
capabilities are particularly attractive to carmakers when they involve outsourcing even more than 
the production function alone (i.e. the detailed design of subassemblies/components). The aim was 
to reduce the volume of fixed assets but above all to cut new car projects’ time-to-market at a time 
when  Western  carmakers  were  not  doing  nearly  as  well  as  their  Japanese  counterparts  (Clark, 
Fujimoto, 1991; Womack, Jone, Roos, 1990). The end result was a rapid decline in direct suppliers 
between 1986 and 1996 (Table 1).  
Table 1 – Number of direct suppliers to selected American and European carmakers (1986-2000) 
  1986  1996  2000 
PSA  1,229  600  500 
BMW  1400  900  600 
Ford  2,400  1,200  1,200 
Chrysler  3,000  1,000  600 
Renault  1,400  540 (1997)  n.a. 
Fiat  1,200 (1987)  380 (1995)  330 (2001) 
Sources: Whitford, Enrietti, 2005; Veloso, Kumar, 2002; Enterprise 
This  design  outsourcing  phase  (or  at  least,  a  phase  marked  by  greater  sharing  between 
suppliers  and  carmakers)  can  be  measured  by  breaking  components  down  by  their  designer. 
Returning to a distinction introduced by K. Clark and T. Fujimito, Table 2 shows that from one decade 
to another, carmakers were increasingly asking their suppliers to develop and design the elements 
(parts) that they needed. It remains that Western suppliers’ very limited initial capabilities meant 
that the carmakers themselves had to get involved. 
Table 2 – Who design the parts? 
  Japan  US  Europe 
  1980s  1990s  1980s  1990s  1980s  1990s 
% of black box parts  62  55  16  30  29  24 
% of detail control parts  30  39  81  58  65  64 
% of suppliers’ proprietory parts  8  6  3  12  6  12 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Source: Fujimoto, 1999, p.201 
As  a  result,  the  Fordist  era  ended  up  in  the  supplier  fabric  atrophying.  Yet  a  pyramid 
architecture assumes that tier 1 suppliers are capable of fulfilling their status. This meant that before 
long, most carmakers started encouraging the emergence of a useful supplier fabric.  
In  Europe,  this  involved  choosing  a  small  number  of  “high  potential”  companies  whose 
development should be supported (Laigle, 1995). Quality certifications became a privileged tool for 
assessing suppliers’ organisational ability to achieve first tier status (Gorgeu, Matthieu, 1995). By so 
doing, carmakers were sowing the seeds for future mega-suppliers. In certain cases, this gestation Egyptian pyramid or Aztec pyramid: how should we describe the industrial architecture… 
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activity involved their prioritising their own equipment-making subsidiaries (whose important role is 
discussed below). At the same time (and as noted by M. Sako and S. Helper in 1999), the late 1990 
witnessed  certain  equipment  making  suppliers  behaving  in  a  very  proactive  manner  and 
autonomously defining their own development strategies. Lamming (1993) has come up with long 
details of suppliers’ emergence strategies, identifying four different categories: 1) leader key players 
with a strong automobile specialisation and whose objective was to become first tier suppliers with 
major automobile-specific R&D activities 2) follower key players comprised of large companies for 
whom the automobile was one product in a broader portfolio; 3) loyal collaborator leaders who 
would  develop  production  and  innovation  capabilities  working  closely  together  with  their  main 
carmaker; and 4) loyal collaborator followers who seemed destined to slip to the bottom of the 
pyramid. The strategies may have differed but the consequence was always to divide suppliers’ roles 
between those who were destined to occupy the carmaker’s first tier versus others whose destiny 
was to be relegated to the second or even third tier.  
This architectural restructuring happened very quickly, especially since it coincided with a new 
internationalisation  phase  for  both  carmakers  and  suppliers.  For  the  former,  productive 
internationalisation led to an increased number of production sites manufacturing identical models 
(and above all, to models being built using identical platforms). Indeed, one major issue in the late 
1990s consisted of reducing the number of platforms used to produce an ever greater number of 
models (Lung et al, 1999). In this view, carmakers were expecting suppliers to achieve economies of 
scale and follow them abroad. The end effect was that suppliers became increasingly selective in 
terms of their own ability to supply different factories producing the same vehicles - leading in turn 
to a certain tightening at the top of the pyramid. Alongside of this, suppliers forced to follow their 
traditional customers abroad suffered from higher fixed costs. To restore margins, they would try to 
capture new local customers, leading in turn during the 1990s to a real race to internationalise by the 
different suppliers in this category, paving the way for a pyramid structure. Indeed, the arrival of new 
foreign suppliers on the scene allowed the break-up of the monopolistic forms that were taking 
shape at a domestic level in the pyramid logic, thereby facilitating its implementation on the part of 
carmakers who continued to worry about the risks of having to face monopolies
3. 
One  special  trajectory  for  suppliers  would  involve  external  growth  since  this  enables 
simultaneous  responses  to  the  twofold  challenge  of  internationalisation  and  the  extension  of 
competencies (technological ones but also organisational competencies since the pyramid logic force 
suppliers to manage their own supply chains). In a 2003 study of 30 of the world’s leading suppliers, 
we estimated that this population engaged in 957 merger and acquisition operations between 1989 
and  July  2003  (Table  3).  Most  of  these  operations  occurred  in  the  developed  world  and  were 
intended to achieve the dual aim of penetrating new markets and enhancing companies’ knowledge 
base. In reality, the 1990s were a decade when the mega-suppliers that would become so central to 
the ensuing modular revolution first began to make themselves known.  
At  a  more  contractual  level,  the  quasi-rent  relational  paradigm  (Asanuma,  1989)  would 
increasingly  become  part  of  the  general  narrative,  with  people  no  longer  talking  about 
subcontracting but instead about partnerships (Lamming, 1993). Clearly, this model – promoting an 
overall coherency - took a long time to establish and halfway through the 1990s a clear distinction 
existed between American and Japanese carmakers (Sako, Helper, 1995) and even their European 
counterparts (Sako, Helper, 1999). 
The road seems, however, to have been clearly laid out: 1) product complexification; 2) bigger 
suppliers due to dual effect of internationalisation and greater R&D capabilities (which started to 
                                                      
3 This derives notably from the history of Western carmakers who are accustomed to dominating their vertical relationships and have little 
experience of the partnership approaches that they ostensibly supported. Egyptian pyramid or Aztec pyramid: how should we describe the industrial architecture… 
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become autonomous insofar as they were no longer specifically attached to a single carmaker); and 
3) the rise of increasingly complex (but not necessarily fair) contracts
4. 















Transportation Equipment  93  15  50  17  40  12  227 
Electronic and Electrical Equipment  51  14  24  6  11  2  108 
Business Services  41  7  20  4  2  2  76 
Metal and Metal Products  40  9  21  2  1  3  76 
Machinery  41  4  8  1  10  2  66 
Communications Equipment  31  4  12  0  1  1  49 
Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods  26  1  9  3  8  2  49 
Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products  13  6  5  1  10  4  39 
Measuring, Medical, Photo Equipment; 
Clocks 
14  1  16  0  1  2  34 
Prepackaged Software  17  0  8  0  2  1  28 
Telecommunications  15  2  5  1  0  2  25 
Textile and Apparel Products  12  2  6  0  1  1  22 
Chemicals and Allied Products  7  1  5  0  2  0  15 
Computer and Office Equipment  8  1  6  0  0  0  15 
Construction Firms  5  0  5  0  2  0  12 
Real Estate; Mortgage Bankers and Brokers  12  0  0  0  0  0  12 
Aerospace and Aircraft  7  0  4  0  0  0  11 
Wood Products, Furniture, and Fixtures  3  0  5  0  2  0  10 
Others (total 21 sectors)  42  5  25  1  1  3  77 
  478  72  234  36  94  37  951 
Note: Two operations could not be classified on a sectorial basis and only four could be classified along 
geographic lines. 
Source: Platinium, Author 
With hindsight, it seems to us that the extension of outsourcing - despite the margin for 
progression that still remained - was destined to run out of steam. It is thus that we interpret the 
success of the modularity theme. 
1.2. The modular era 
In the late 1990s/early 2000s – a time when suppliers and carmakers would often be found 
working alongside one another - modularity became a permanent focus that would sometimes even 
become a fantasy for these parties. Carmakers hoped that they could use this as a solution for their 
recurring  problem  with  fixed  costs  and  customer  diversification.  Modularity  would  enable  a 
reduction in the number of platforms while allowing carmakers to maintain and even increase the 
number of different versions that they could offer customers (Gawer, Cusunamo, 2002). It would 
open the door to mass cutomisation while reducing the time required for design and production and 
paving the way for a new outsourcing phase (Sako, 2003; McAlinden, Smith, Swiecki, 1999). As for 
suppliers, the ones who had been most committed to the earlier consolidation trend saw this as an 
opportunity for passing a threshold and consolidating their position as major players. Moreover, it 
was  in  Europe,  where  supply  consolidation  had  made  the  most  progress,  that  the  modularity 
temptation received the greatest priority (Sako, Warburton, 1999). 
                                                      
4 Flynn (1998) provides good information on the gaps between narratives about partnerships and real practices for carmakers like GM. A 
decade later, these practices still seemed inconsistent (Senter, McManus, 2009). Egyptian pyramid or Aztec pyramid: how should we describe the industrial architecture… 
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At the turn-of-the-century, forecasters were predicting very strong growth in the modules 
market for the ten years to come, expecting average values to rise from USD794 per vehicle in 2000 
and the contents of supplier-delivered modules to rise to USD1,764 by 2010 - a 166% jump in the 
global market for modules (Table 4). 
Table 4 –Growth forecasts in the market for outsourced modules in 2000 
in USD 000s  2000  2010  Index base 100 in 2000 
Total modules  41,682  111,050  266 
Inc.       
Internal modules  16,974  45,960  271 
Chassis and external  5,206  20,312  390 
Driving system  19,504  44,781  230 
Average value per vehicle (units)  794  1,763  222 
Source: AutoBusiness-SSB, 2004 
Futurologists began to see the automobile as a puzzle comprised of different modules (the 
number 50 was sometime mentioned) produced by a few suppliers delivering to all of the factories 
worldwide whose assembly operations involved the use of shared platforms. More modestly,  the 
idea began to make its way that modularity was destined to thoroughly restructure the ambient 
industrial architecture by means of a highly pyramidal form of organisation featuring a few mega-
suppliers delivering complex modules and systems - with any leftover subcontracting (split among 
the remaining suppliers) becoming very marginal. In parallel to this, mega-suppliers were supposed 
to head subcontracting networks, consolidating an already highly structured supply pyramid and 
causing its peak to narrow even further.  
At a theoretical level, analysis of modularity - such as K. Ulrich (1995) and C. Baldwin and K. 
Clark (2000) were described it – produced a few keys enabling an explanation of  this phenomenon. 
Noted characteristics included a decoupling of the design and production functions; the growing 
separation (and lesser sequentiality) between tasks; a vision of interfaces as cognitive coordination 
mechanisms; and asset de-specification, something that should theoretically facilitate competition 
among suppliers (Veloso, Fixon, 2001). T. Sturgeon and R. Florida (2001) offered a good synopsis of 
the tendencies that seemed to be taking shape at the time. 
Even so, some modularity studies stressed that this thinking draws excessive inspiration from 
an  IT  model  that  is  actually  quite  different:  computer or  electronic  products  are  born  modular; 
whereas the automobile is born an integrated product and must be modularised
5. This contrast was 
developed  in  system  integrator  studies  demonstrating  the  inappropriateness  of  this  simplified 
scheme for the complex products found in many industries (Prencipe, Davies, Hobday, 2003). As the 
systems product par excellence (Clark, Fujimoto, 1991), the automobile belongs to this category 
(Sako, 2003; Takeishi, Fujimoto, 2003). 
Yet despite modularity’s imperfection, certain effects do occur. The automobile has its own 
way of breaking down the modularity concept, namely through macro-components (Volpato, 2004) 
that are physically compact and multi-functional. This solution has two consequences. Firstly, and 
contrary to the lessons of (pure) modularity, it is not compatible with the interface standardisation 
(cognitive field) and asset de-specification (contractual field). This means that there is little hope of 
imposing a vanishing hand (Langlois, 2003) in the automotive sector. Inter-firm relationships remain 
dominated by complex modes of coordination (Lung, 2001) such as pragmatic collaborations (Helper, 
                                                      
5 We are talking about the modern era here since the first automobiles came from the assembly of components purchased from different 
industries, refuting the hypothesis that they were modular in nature (McAlinden, Smith, Swiecki, 1999). The mass production/vertical 
integration tandem subsequently drove the automobile product towards a more integrated architecture. Egyptian pyramid or Aztec pyramid: how should we describe the industrial architecture… 
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MacDuffie, Sabel, 2000). Secondly, the solution is actually compatible with a pyramid logic and even 
reinforces it. This is because, as aforementioned, the pyramid logic requires a technical division of 
labour  based  on  a  logic  of  components  interlinked  along  hierarchical  lines.  Macro-components 
pursue this interlinked logic to the extent that it becomes possible to envisage a social division of 
labour  guided  by  a  technical  division  of  labour.  This  enables  the  hypothesis  of  an  advanced 
organisational isomorphism, of the kind explored in modularity research by Sanchez and Mahoney 
(1996) - even if not all of their justificatory apparatus is relevant to the present analysis. 






Part numbers  104  1 
Assembly time  22.4 min.  3.3 min 
Total cost reduction  Baseline  -USD79 
Source: McAlinden, Smith, Swiecki, 1999, p.10 
Thus, a phenomenon of aggregation – to wit, the advent of macro-components – is what 
enabled  a  reduction  in  the  number  of  parts  being  directly  purchased  by  carmakers,  while  also 
reducing assembly times and macro-component’s overall cost (Table 5). Combined with a multi-
sourcing limitation effort aimed at enabling suppliers to achieve economies of scale and at least 
some systematisation (see below) of their global sourcing, this shift in the object of exchange also led 
to a reduction in the number of direct suppliers (see Table 4). In parallel, European carmakers were 
now displaying vertical integration rates that ranged, depending on the model, between 10 and 30%. 
J. Whitford and A. Enrietti (2005) have shown that between 1982 and 2000, for instance, Fiat’s share 
of outsourced production rose from 50 to 72%, with outsourced design jumping from 30 to 72%. 
Recent calculations involving the automaking sector showed in France a fall from an already weak 
integration rate of 16.2% in 2003 to 14.5% in 2007 (Author from INSEE data). 
Whereas modularity can be seen as an extension of earlier trends (Sako, 2003) anchored in 
people’s belief in the virtue of downsizing, refocusing on core competencies and the primacy of 
finance (Jürgens et al., 2002), it also had a strong effect on suppliers. Consequences included a 
proliferation of merger/acquisition operations; the development of inhouse R&D capabilities (with, 
for instance, the creation of global research centres focused on upstream issues); strong product 
innovation  (and  the  proposal  of  increasingly  complex  modules);  and  internal  reorganisations 
converting components divisions into module divisions (Fourcade, Midler, 2005). In reality, what we 
have witnessed is the creation of mega-suppliers whose vocation is to offer modules and occupy the 
whole of the supply pyramid’s first tier.  
1.3. The rise of mega-suppliers 
The development of modular production is based on the assumption that a suppliers fabric will 
be available and capable of undertaking the tangible and intangible investments that come with this 
supplier-module producer role. In this context, the modular era should enable large suppliers from 
the previous era to pass a threshold and become mega-suppliers. Automotive News analysis of the 
world’s 100 largest equipment suppliers helps to measure this trend.  
Table 9 portrays the cumulative sales of the world’s hundred largest suppliers according to 
their OEM automobile sales. Between 1999 and 2008, sales to carmakers grew by a spectacular 
83.8%. In 2008, total equipment and component sales for this group reached USD 607,731 million. 
One symbol of these companies’ growing size is that average sales hit USD 6,077 million in 2008. 
Along the way, it is also worth noting the effects of the recent crisis, with cumulative sales by the 
companies in this group falling by nearly 22% between 2000 and 2009.  Egyptian pyramid or Aztec pyramid: how should we describe the industrial architecture… 
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Table 6 – Total of OEM automotive parts sales by 100 leading auto part suppliers 





Total  of  100  leading 
auto part sales  330,648.0  512,550.0  607,731.0  474,814.0  83.8%  -21.9% 
Median  2,044.5  3,108.5  3,383.5  2,740.5  65.5%  -19.0% 
Mean  3,306.5  5,125.5  6,077.3  4,748.1  83.8%  -21.9% 
Source: Original data from Automotive News, different years 
Examining the trajectory of the world’s main equipment suppliers, four phenomena explain 
the rise of mega-suppliers (for developments in this area, Frigant, 2009; for detailed examples of 
companies, Klier, Rubinstein, 2008). 
There  is  little  doubt  that the  root  cause  is market growth,  itself  a  direct  consequence  of 
carmakers’ vertical disintegration. Note in addition that the companies that grew most quickly during 
this  time  were  the  ones  who  offered  complex  module  products  (Frigant,  2009).  Conversely, 
traditional large special suppliers such as tire manufacturers or glass makers tended to drop in the 
Automotive News rankings. 
A major merger/acquisition trend was encouraged by a dual mouvement: the need to develop 
the scope of competencies to enable the design and production of increasingly complex elements 
(modularisation logic); and the opportunity/necessity of internationalising. Here, the modular era can 
be seen as a direct extension of a previous period in terms of actors’ reason for merging – with the 
aim  of  developing  a  global  presence  becoming  even  stronger,  as  witnessed  by  the  growing 
magnitude  of  greenfield  investments.  More  and  more  supplier  park  sites  were  being  built  in 
carmakers’ immediate vicinity due to the significant proximity constraints that are associated with 
modules (Frigant, Lung, 2002). Alongside of this, equipment suppliers (in part due to pressure from 
carmakers and/or their shareholders) build an increasing number of facilities in low-cost countries 
located  on  the  edges  of  major  automobile  production  zones  (Mexico  for  North  America,  cf. 
Contreras,  Carrillo,  Estrada,  2010;  Eastern  Europe/North  Africa/Turkey  for  Western  Europe,  cf. 
Domanski & Lung, 2009; for a comparison between Europe and North America, Klier & Rubenstein, 
2011). 
A  third  point  worth  noting  is  that  equipment  supply  subsidiaries  were  far  from  having 
disappeared.  Growth  in  outsourcing  was  not  necessarily  accompanied  by  disintegration,  in  the 
capital-ownership  sense  of  this  term.  American  carmakers  may  well  have  sold  off  their  large 
equipment  supply  subsidiaries  (starting  with  Delphi  and  Visteon)  but  their  counterparts  did  not 
necessarily follow the same path. Not satisfied with being the world’s leading carmaker, Toyota is 
also nowadays the world’s largest equipment supplier. In 2009, for instance this Japanese giant held 
a direct 22.5% stake in Denso, the sector’s global leader, while also owning part of Aisin Seiki (the 
third  world  supplier  according  to  Automotive  News).  Hyundai  also  has  some  very  powerful 
subsidiaries (including Hyundai Mobis, the world’s 12
th largest supplier in 2009). Peugeot might be 
added to this list with Faurecia (global number seven, with the French carmaker holding a 57.4% 
stake) as can Fiat with Magnetti-Marelli (24
th). In short, the idea that a company is engaged in 
outsourcing can be quite misleading. It remains that the real novelty here is that the subsidiaries in 
question become more autonomous over time and were encouraged to diversify their customer 
bases and become fully-fledged profit centres. Of course, in 2010 Denso was still realising nearly half 
of its total sales with Toyota (for Aisin Seiki the figure was 67.7%) but others such as Faurecia have 
largely reduced their dependency on their parent company (with Volkswagen having been Faurecia’s 
main customer for several years now). Still, there is no doubt that the growth of these equipment 
supply  subsidiaries  has  been  rooted  in  their  parent  company  relationships,  something  that  has 
enabled them to develop their customer portfolios subsequently. Egyptian pyramid or Aztec pyramid: how should we describe the industrial architecture… 
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The final element is harder to measure and involves the performance of certain companies 
seeking to build a product strategy (in the sense given to this term by Boyer, Freyssenet, 2005) that 
corresponds to carmakers’ new expectations. In part, this harks back to the earlier phenomenon of 
being able to anticipate different forms of outsourcing but doing this now along more qualitative 
lines. The early 2000s witnessed suppliers deploying different - and divergent - strategies in terms of 
how they were positioning themselves in the emerging market for modules (Frigant, Lung, 2001). 
Some (like Magna) wanted to position themselves as quasi-second generation carmakers capable of 
assembling all major modules used in a car’s production. Others focused on accumulating production 
and research competencies relevant to the key components that they were trying to transform into 
modules. In all of these cases, suppliers were coping with the problem of having to restructure their 
product divisions and would tend to hesitate between their initial mission as component makers and 
the business of a modules manufacturer (Fourcade, Midler, 2004). 
In the early 2010s, these mega-suppliers seemed to have completed the construction of the 
supply pyramid. The market for certain modules appeared to be under the total control of just a few 
oligopolies
6. Several specialists asserted that carmakers had lost the competencies they need for the 
detailed design of certain important modules (Morris, Donnelly, 2006), to such an extent that the 
reappropriation of such competencies seemed impossible or at least unlikely (Zirpoli, Becker, 2010). 
What this means is that the most accurate image depicting a supply chain has mutated into 
that of an Egyptian pyramid that is very narrow at the top (where only a few mega-suppliers with a 
global vocation play leading roles) but features, at its lower levels, companies with more of a national 
vocation carrying out certain production or service activities on first tier companies’ behalf. Lastly, 
beyond these levels this is a vast number of SMEs locked into subcontractor roles. All three tiers are 
relatively hermetic and there is little hope for a company to move from one tier to another. Figure 1 
illustrates this representation.  
Figure 1 – Egyptian pyramid 
Modular mega-suppliers (incl. subsidiaries of OEM)
Components suppliers & large specialists
Small components suppliers & subcontractors
Carmaker
 
                                                      
6 Sutherland (2005, p.243) have offerd a table with market share for several mega-suppliers in the global OEM market: Bosch and Delphi 
are respectively responsible for 52% and 21% of diesel fuel injection pumps sales; ITT and Bosch for 25% and 31% of all ABS brake systems; 
GKN for 40% of all constant velocity joints sales, etc. Nolan, Zhang and Liu (2008, p.38) have provided figures indicating the same type of 
market concentration.  Egyptian pyramid or Aztec pyramid: how should we describe the industrial architecture… 
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Although the aforementioned developments have helped to forge this representation, we still 
consider that it is overly simplistic and obfuscates issues that are important for the future of the 
automotive industry. 
II. A more comprehensive metaphor: the Aztec pyramid 
The  pyramid  representation of  the  supply  chain  clearly  reflects the  reality of  this  sector’s 
industrial architecture. Criticizing its existence is irrelevant. What - we can try to show, however, is 
that it is somewhat misleading and neglects several important factual elements.  
2.1. Questioning some obvious facts 
The presence of oligopolies in a few components market does not mean, however, that all 
components and equipment purchased by carmakers have fallen under the control of a handful of 
mega-suppliers.  Contrary  to  certain  predictions  from  the  early  2000s  (Sturgeon,  Florida,  2001; 
McAlinden et al., 1999), actors in this industry remain very diverse. The march towards modularity 
has not entirely suppressed actors’ reliance on subcontracting nor has it enabled the advent of global 
sourcing.  Carmakers  still  call  upon  SMEs  for  part  of  their  sourcing  needs  and  -  alongside  the 
components supplied by a few oligopolies – many continue to source supplies from a large number 
of firms that are in competition with one another. 
One relatively indirect way of measuring this consists of studying the concentration levels 
found in equipment supplies markets. Using a simple sample comprised of the world’s hundred 
leading equipment suppliers, Lorenz curves moved between 1999 and 2008 somewhat nearer the 
line of equality (Figure 2). This means that, contrary to popular belief, vertical disintegration did not 
lead to increased competition in the global market for OEM supplies, thereby benefiting just a few 
actors. At the same time, we should be clear that for certain components, equipment suppliers did in 
fact start to enjoy a quasi-monopoly or narrow oligopoly. This indicates that in the fast-growing 
global market for OEM supplies, actors that are (relatively) smaller in size succeeded in capturing a 
growing share of total sales.  





























































Source: Author from Automotive News data 
Furthermore,  a  study of Automotive  News’s  year-to-year  global  rankings shows significant 
fluctuations, with 46% of the equipment suppliers work featured in 2009’s top 100 having been 
absent from this elite in 1999. Certainly, some companies disappeared in the aftermath of M&A Egyptian pyramid or Aztec pyramid: how should we describe the industrial architecture… 
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operations, but the main lesson is that the structure of the parts market remains highly variable. The 
positions  that  suppliers  acquire  are  not  totally  static  insofar  as  the  industry  has  seen  a  whole 
succession of successes and failures.  
Another question is what do we call a direct supplier? The question is how these actors should 
be  defined.  In  the  part  of  its  annual  report  that  Renault  uses  to  discuss  its  corporate  social 
responsibility (CSR) initiatives, the company stated in 2009 that it had more than 800 direct suppliers. 
But does this mean that Renault had increased its number of direct suppliers since 1997 - or simply 
that it books them differently? For instance, is it Renault’s intention to “oversee” the activities of its 
tier 1 and tier 2 suppliers in terms of their CSR behavior? Under a similar heading, Peugeot’s annual 
report speaks of its panel audit (suggesting that this is only a sample) of “500 supplier groups and 
7,000 service and equipment suppliers” - all of whom are supposed to account for 70% of its vehicle 
return costs (PSA 2010 annual report, page 16). These figures are also very different from the ones 
announced  a  decade  before.  It  may  be  true  that  Peugeot’s  output  has  considerably  increased, 
diversified and internationalised over this time but the numbers nevertheless seem to translate the 
fact  that  what  carmakers  call  direct  suppliers  nowadays  are  basically  major  suppliers  producing 
modules or complex systems rather than the totality of their suppliers. Actually, with the image of a 
pyramid tending to become the collective representation, we run the risk of only viewing as direct 
suppliers those actors who produce major components. Note that in this very same annual report, 
Peugeot states that it has assembled in “300 main suppliers” at a strategic conference. The doubt 
here is whether these are 300 suppliers of complex modules and subassemblies alone.  
This questioning of commonly used data suggests that the problem might be broached from 
another direction and that suppliers themselves be surveyed. This is the approach that the third part 
of this section will follow. Beforehand, however, we will analyse how overusing this metaphor has led 
to certain strategic actors being excluded from the overall analysis. 
2.2. One over-simplification: the forgotten (big) suppliers 
An initial simplification is the way in which important transversal actors belonging to different 
tiers have been forgotten: suppliers of raw or pre-transformed materials and ancillary components, 
on one hand; and engineering companies on the other
7. 
The first group of companies is particularly interesting to consider since it often involves very 
large  companies  entertaining  relatively  singular  reports  with  the  automotive  industry.  Examples 
include suppliers of transformed metals, chemical products (paint, etc.) basic elements (plastic ball 
bearings) and ancillary components such as chips or sensors.  
An initial characteristic of these companies relates to the way in which they have envisioned 
their  own  positioning  in  the  automotive  sector.  These  are  often  multinationals  possessing  a 
diversified customer portfolio operating both inside and outside of this sector. It is clear that they 
might have structured their businesses into dedicated automotive units but this activity is only one 
among  many  others.  Indeed,  from  a  financial  portfolio  perspective,  this  entire  business  can  be 
considered  as  one  asset  among  many  others.  Thus,  these  are  companies  that  compare  the 
profitability of their automotive activity with their other business lines. The automotive division must 
be profitable or face the risk of being sold off. This is particularly important to the way in which 
market relations are structured between buyers and suppliers, given that the firms the question 
often find themselves in an oligopolistic position.  
                                                      
7 We might also mention capital goods producers or support service suppliers (logistics, IT) but the present article has taken the conscious 
step of focusing solely on the supply chain in the strict sense of this term. Egyptian pyramid or Aztec pyramid: how should we describe the industrial architecture… 
 
14
A second characteristic is that these companies tend to operate at different levels of the 
pyramid.  They  can  be  in  direct  contact  with  carmakers  but  also  with  tier  1,  2  or  3  suppliers. 
Sometimes one and the same company supplies a single supply chain several times. Examples include 
steel companies supplying chassis carmakers, tier 1 actors in charge of producing car doors plus tier 2 
or 3 suppliers producing mechanical items (Jung, 2005).  
Neglecting these suppliers seems to undermine general understanding of how supply chains 
function now and in the future. There are three reasons for this: 
1)  Market power. These companies’ status enables them to put themselves in a strong position to 
demand high margins. There can also be a quantity effect. For instance, during 2010’s strong 
recovery period phase, some second tier suppliers found it hard to source raw materials and 
strategic components. As a result, several carmakers’ assembly chains had to interrupt output
8. 
This meant that competitors with sufficient stocks were able to make progress in markets from 
which  they  had  initially  been  excluded.  The  end  result  was  a  redistribution  of  cards  in  the 
hierarchy of suppliers. The resource problems that are bound to arise in the future will inevitably 
amplify these price and quantity problems. Thanks to their ability to buy in bulk and/or use 
futures  markets,  carmakers  or  mega-suppliers  should  be  able  to  reconsider  their  degree  of 
vertical integration or develop material purchasing practices on their own contractors’ behalf.  
2)  A second element pertains to customers’ location choices. Generally, even as observers have 
highlighted  the  centripetal  forces  that  exist  between  modular-suppliers  and  carmakers,  they 
have tended to neglect supplier companies despite the fact that their production plants often 
represent very heavy investments at the heart of major industrial zones. It is true that many 
goods (i.e. electronic components) are easy to transport and that the zones in question are 
extensible. It remains that a barycentric logic continues to apply to transformed products such as 
steel.  The  probable  future  rise  in  transportation  costs  could  be  an  obstacle  for  a  certain 
automotive suppliers thinking about moving to zones where no such companies can be found in 
the “relative vicinity”. Remember that these are companies for whom it is difficult to find good 
quality raw transformed products in certain countries.  
3)  A  third  element  relates  to  suppliers’  innovation  roles.  Such  companies  are  often  relatively 
innovative and capable of product development. However, this also means that they will often 
require changes in the products that their own suppliers are providing. For instance, innovations 
in different plastics’ properties have helped to alter the breakdown between metals and plastics 
in automaking. When the supplier of a particular kind of material (i.e. plastic) creates an alliance 
with  an  automotive  supplier  with  a  view  towards  greater  innovation,  this  can  upset  the 
foundations of the supply pyramid - as witnessed in France with the example of Plastic Omnium, 
which in just a few years has been able to burnish its role as a tier 1 player in the European 
industry (Frigant, 2011).  
Engineering companies have also been neglected in this pyramid vision. Such firms can involve 
very small and highly specialised structures featuring very specific competencies that they share with 
the automotive industry. However, they can also involve larger internationalised companies that 
often deploy their know-how in a number of different industries
9. Once again, these are actors who 
do not necessarily work exclusively for carmakers. They can operate a behalf of first tier suppliers 
(and  more  infrequently  for  lower  tier  suppliers).  According  to  Dannenberg  and  Burgard  (2007), 
                                                      
8  http://plasticsnews.com/headlines2.html?id=21002. The  March  2011  earthquake  in  Japan  and  carmakers  and  suppliers’  subsequent 
components  shortage  highlighted  the  existence  of  these  highly  diversified  multinationals  who  produce  basic  components  for  the 
automotive industry. 
9 Literature has barely studied these firms, even though their growth is closely tied to the vertical disintegration trend. For historical 
quantitative data, it is worth consulting the website of the few exemplary firms, including SEGULA Technologies, The Bertrandt Group, IAV 
GmbH - Ingenieurgesellschaft Auto und Verkehr, MCA Ingénierie, etc. Egyptian pyramid or Aztec pyramid: how should we describe the industrial architecture… 
 
15
engineering service providers make, in 2005, 8% of total automotive RD expenditure (€5.5billion 
from their own due, €5 billion are projects paid by suppliers and €3.0 billion are projects paid by 
carmakers). In a general context of vertical disintegration, engineering companies play an important 
role due to their triple mission:  
1)  They possess cutting-edge knowledge in different areas and can therefore change cars and 
modules’ architecture; 
2)  In some instances they will be responsible for the cognitive coordination of actors during 
development projects; 
3)  They enable communications between different actors and help to ensure the dissemination 
of knowledge among employees from different partner companies. Here again (and similarly 
to materials suppliers), the association between these companies and tier 1 or 2 suppliers 
can lead a redefinition of the latter’s role whenever such collaboration culminates in the 
invention of new products.  
Including these firms does not mean that we need to reject the pyramid vision of industrial 
architecture.  However,  we  should  be  fine-tuning  our  image  of  supply  chains  and  re-integrate 
important actors into the analysis, particularly ones destined to assume crucial roles in the future. 
This remains compatible with Egyptian metaphor except on one point, namely the idea that the 
pyramid’s different tiers are clearly determined. The reason is that these are multi-level actors with a 
modicum of power to change automobile suppliers’ place in the hierarchy. In other words, these 
companies’ presence justifies subtle changes in the otherwise well-structured, well-ranked pyramid 
vision of branch actors. What remains is the question as to what role SMEs play in this overall vision. 
2.3. The forgotten (small) suppliers: Lessons derived from analysis of French 
automotive SMEs 
A second area of investigation is SMEs’ role in this pyramid. We are suggesting that analysis at 
this level should reverse the customary perspective and instead ask questions of carmakers, who are 
often far too hasty to assimilate direct suppliers with modular suppliers because this makes them 
sound  modern.  The  study  we  have  conducted  is  unprecedented  in  the  way  that  it  focuses  on 
suppliers who specifically belong to the automotive supply chain. Undertaken in June/July 2010, it 
works on two points that are critical of the Egyptian metaphor. Firstly, it notes that a relatively large 
number  of  SMEs  operate  on  tier 1,  undermining  the  idea  of a  market  structured  solely around 
modular suppliers. Secondly, actors’ position in the pyramid appears more instable than the pyramid 
vision suggests.  
2.3.1. Data and methodology 
Our survey started by refusing the presumption that companies belong to a particular supply 
chain.  This  is  because  such  approaches  always  return  to  the  same  companies,  often  (and 
unsurprisingly) large equipment suppliers. Instead, one of our research objectives was to construct a 
database for smaller companies working in the automotive industry at different tiers in the pyramid, 
while potentially also operating in a number of different sectors. Towards this end, we compiled a 
survey sample from an exhaustive list of companies residing in France and operating in sectors that 
the automotive industry uses intensively
10. Subsequently, this sample was filtered to only include 
companies with less than 5,000 employees and revenues below €1.5 billion
11. The sample included 
                                                      
10 The selection of sectors studied here is based on research undertaken by the French National Statistics Institute (INSEE), which books 
automotive industry purchases on a sectorial basis.  
11 This threshold refers to a specific category of SMEs: ETIs (enterprises of intermediary size). Egyptian pyramid or Aztec pyramid: how should we describe the industrial architecture… 
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8,740 companies, with 1,340 having responded, a response rate of 15.3%. After examining these 
responses, we added the following supplementary criteria: the company must have derived at least 
5%  of  its  revenues  from  the  automotive  industry;  and  the  questionnaire  must  be  sufficiently 
thorough to be analysable. Finally, we obtain 750 answers. 
Table  7  shows  that  our  database  does  not  cover  all  of  the  economic  sectors  required  to 
produce a modern automobile. Indeed, the survey methodology does not allow us to cover certain 
sectors due to our inability to identify relevant companies. In addition, in certain cases we did not 
receive any responses. One example here was technical textiles, where none of the companies we 
wanted to survey replied. It remains that the crucial sectors were all represented. Metallic products 
manufacturers are best represented in our database - an unsurprising outcome given this sector’s 
importance to the automotive business. Another major sector is automobiles themselves (referring 
here  to  manufacturers  of  automotive  equipments).  Then  came  two  sectors  (combined  for  our 
purposes); IT, electronic and optical product manufacturers (especially the latter two); and electrical 
equipment suppliers. Lastly, note the small number responses from engineering companies. This can 
be explained by the fact that very few small actors operate in this particular field in the French 
economy (remember that the report specifically covers SMEs).  
Table 7 – Suppliers’ sector of origin 
Sector (aggregate level)  % of suppliers 
Automobile (equipments)  17.1% 
Manufacturing of IT-related and electronic products/optics or electric equipment  12.8% 
Capital goods  6.3% 
Engineering  0.8% 
Manufacturing of metallic products  56.8% 
Metallurgy  2.7% 
Manufacturing of rubber and plastic products  2.5% 
Manufacturing of other mineral non-metallic products  0.9% 
Number of suppliers: N=750  100% 
Source: OSEO (2011) 
All in all, the sample is not entirely representative of the companies mobilised by automakers 
and automotive equipment suppliers. However, it does provide a good basis for further study. When 
we  compared  our  data  with  figures  provided  by  French  automotive  industry  associations,  what 
became clear is that they estimate the number of suppliers residing in France at something like 
4,000. Thus, our database represents 18.7% of suppliers identified by actors in this branch (18.1% in 
revenue terms). 
Companies belonging to the sample generate average revenues of €9.48 million with a median 
figure of around €1.60 million. Globally, therefore, these are relatively small companies, as confirmed 
by the average number of staff members as of December 2009: 52.6 employees. This average is 
further lowered by the fact that 36% of the sample companies have fewer than 10 employees. At the 
other extreme, 5% have more than 250 employees (with the largest having 1,430 staff members). 
Note that the tables below will indicate the thresholds we used (250; 1,500). In terms of French 
industry as a whole, “large” SMEs are over-represented in our database, something that can probably 
be explained by the automobile’s “mass industry” aspect. 
Our survey method contained one risk, namely that we would select companies with little 
relationship to the automobile. The breakdown of the revenues generated by our sample companies 
by their target customers offers some reassurance along these lines, however. On average, 77.7 
percent of sales were in the automotive sector, whether this involved firms working on tier 1, 2 and 3 Egyptian pyramid or Aztec pyramid: how should we describe the industrial architecture… 
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(and beyond) or spare parts markets
12. Lastly, a final specification for this discussion of our sample 
(readers can find more information in OSEO, 2011) is that we are studying companies that reside in 
France, which can involve foreign companies that have set up operations in France. Although the 
database does not reveal the nationality of the company in question, its can be assumed that we are 
mainly dealing with French companies since 75.7% declare that they are independent (with the 
others saying that they are members of financial or industrial groups). Nevertheless, it should not be 
concluded that these are companies that only work for the French automotive industry. After all, 
exports account for 14.1% of their total sales – a relatively high rate, compared with the whole of the 
French economy and given the significance of micro-enterprises. Also, among companies with more 
than 250 employees, the export rate reaches 46.1%. It is 29.6% for companies with between 50 and 
249 employees and 12.8% for companies with between 10 and 49 employees. 




Total  Mean  Median 
Sales (€000s)  747  7,081,773  9,480.3  1,600 
Employees   749  39,432  52.6  15 
Total sales/auto. sales (%)
1  716  -  77.7%  100% 
Exports/sales (%)  729  -  14.1%  3% 
20% of suppliers do less than 30% of sales in automotive sector; 6%Î[31, 60[; 7%Î[61, 90]; 67% > 90%. 
Source: OSEO (2011) 
Without  being  perfect,  the  database  constitutes  an  original  tool  for  studying  the  current 
situations of French SMEs working in the automotive sector. Notably, it allows us to show that these 
companies are not in fact really being excluded from the supply pyramid.  
2.3.2. Yes, SMEs can be first tier suppliers 
Thanks to the question asking companies to break revenues down by their tier of supply chain 
involvement, we could verify whether, in 2009, the SMEs that we studied were or were not excluded 
from the first tier in the pyramid.  
There are two ways of reasoning at this level. We can consider this as the main tier where 
these companies operate - or else, as the highest tier that they mention. It is true that a company can 
operate on several tiers simultaneously. Therefore, the first measure consists of taking the highest 
percentage of revenues. For instance, a company stating that it achieves 10% of its revenues on tier 1 
and 20% on tier 2 will be mainly considered as a tier 2 supplier. The second method, which consists 
of taking the highest tier that a company mentions, would mean that we would consider it a tier 1 
supplier. 
Table 9 – Suppliers’ position in the pyramid (N=715) 
  Tier 1  Tier 2  Tier 3 and more  Spare parts  Total 
Main tier  25.9%  47.8%  21.7%  4.6%  100% 
Higher tier  35.5%  45.5%  16.1%  2.9%  100% 
Source: OSEO (2011) 
Table 9 shows that the most frequently mentioned tier is 2: 47.8% of all respondents’ prime 
supply chain intervention is at this level, with 21.7% operating on tier 3 or further down and only 
4.6% stating that their main link to the automotive business is their spare parts activity. It remains 
                                                      
12 Companies had to break total revenues down between “automotive” and “non-automotive”. For “automotive”, revenues had to be 
broken down by counterparts’ level of intervention in the supply chain. This is crucial for the elimination of irrelevant questionnaires and 
underpins the subsequent analysis.  Egyptian pyramid or Aztec pyramid: how should we describe the industrial architecture… 
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that the key finding for our analysis is that nearly 26% of all the SMEs that we surveyed are first tier 
suppliers. 
This  initial  approach  can  be  usefully  supplemented  by  a  second  one  where,  rather  than 
focusing on the tiers that a company usually occupies, we asked questions about the highest tier that 
they would declare. By construction, this should give us a higher number of companies situated 
toward the top of the pyramid. According to this second approach, 45% of SMEs operate at the level 
of tier 1, and 16.1% on tier 3 and below. Only 2.9% are attached to the supply chain exclusively 
because of their spare part market activities
13. Of course, 35.5% of the SMEs that we studied stated 
that they conduct some of their activities directly on automakers’ behalf.  
This change in focus has only a slight effect on our snapshot. Although we can confirm that the 
SMEs that answered our survey are primary the tier 2 suppliers, it remains that a significant number 
of these companies are also first tier suppliers. Clearly, this does not mean that SMEs account for a 
lion’s  share  of  the  market  for  outsourced  components.  We  cannot  deny,  however,  that  mega-
suppliers account for the largest orders (in volume and value terms). Similarly, we accept that a 
response bias exists and that the companies who respond to a survey are more likely to be ones who 
feel  close  to  carmakers.  Nevertheless,  even  if  we  accept  that  these  figures  might  be  biased  in 
magnitude terms, they still demonstrate that vehicle manufacturers remain accessible to SMEs. The 
OEM market is not an exclusive hunting ground for mega-suppliers. 
As  such  -  and  in  terms  of  the controversy  between  Herrigel  and  Sturgeon/Florida  - these 
findings tend to support the former’s position. This suggests that far from being an infancy issue, the 
modularisation of the automotive business has not completely relegated SMEs to the bottom of the 
pyramid. 
Note, however, that among this group of SMEs there is a relatively clear relationship between 
size and the main tier where they intervene in the supply chain (Table 10). The large SMEs featuring 
in the sample achieve most of their automotive-related revenues either on tier 1 (70%) or tier 2 
(30%). This relationship between size and tier also applies to companies with between 50 and 249 
employees because 35.4% of all respondents operate mainly on tier 1, 52.1% on tier 2 and 7.3% on 
tier 3 or beyond. Similarly, companies with 10 to 49 employees are mainly active on tier 2 (52.1%). 
Only 21.0% of them operate mainly on tier 1 and 22.5% on tier 3. This downwards movement also 
applies to micro-enterprises since 43.3% are mainly tier 2 suppliers and 29.8% mainly tier 3 suppliers. 





Tier 1  Tier 2  Tier 3  Spare 
parts 
Total 
[250; 1500]  40  70.0%  30.0%  0.0%  0.0%  100% 
[50; 249]  96  35.4%  52.1%  7.3%  5.2%  100% 
[10; 49]  334  21.0%  52.1%  22.5%  4.5%  100% 
< 10  245  21.6%  43.3%  29.8%  5.3%  100% 
Total  715  185  342  155  33  - 
Source: OSEO (2011) 
2.3.3. No, the hierarchy is not as straightforward as it seems 
This pyramidal vision of the supply chain contains the idea that a certain hermeticism exists 
between  different  tiers.  The  restructuring  of  the  industrial  architecture  is  said  to  have  led  to 
                                                      
13 By construction, these companies do not operate in tiers 1, 2 or 3 since they would have been ranked in one of the preceding tiers. Egyptian pyramid or Aztec pyramid: how should we describe the industrial architecture… 
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companies being clearly positioned at one and only one tier in the hierarchy. Variances between 
different lines in Table 12 suggest to the contrary that a number of multi-level companies do exist. To 
explore this possibility, we have listed companies according to whether they state their automotive 
revenues in terms of one or several tiers (Table 11).  
Table 11 – Breakdown of suppliers by number of tiers where they operate (2009) 
One tier suppliers  Multi-tier suppliers 
(N=432)  60.59%  (N=281)  39.41% 
First tier alone  12.9%  2 tiers  30.9% 
Second tier alone  30.4%  3 tiers  7.6% 
Third tier alone  14.7%  4 tiers  1.0% 
Spare parts alone  2.5%     
Source: OSEO (2011) 
Most companies are only operating at a single tier of the hierarchy (60.6%). 30.4% of all SMEs 
are second tier suppliers and nothing else. 14.7% and 12.9% of SMEs are tier 3 or tier 1 suppliers 
alone. 2.5% of SMEs are spare part suppliers alone. These findings seem to support the hypothesis 
that suppliers’ roles are split across the whole of the supply pyramid. It remains that the fact that 
39.4% of all companies operate at several tiers simultaneously in one and the same year (remember 
that  these  are  snapshot  statistics)  suggests  a  different  interpretation  of  the  data,  namely  that 
companies’ positioning in the hierarchy is less strict than might be assumed with analyses conducted 
in pyramid terms. Nearly 31% of SMEs operate on two tiers simultaneously and 7.6% operate on 
three tiers simultaneously. The example drawn here of companies operating on all three of the 
pyramid tiers (and who also supply spare parts) is, however, very rare and only accounts for 1% of all 
suppliers. 
Table  12  shows  that  multi-tier  companies’  most  frequently  observed  combinations  are 
between neighbouring tiers and combine two levels. Out of the 281 multi-tier SMEs, 31.0% operate 
simultaneously on tiers 1 and 2, with 29.2% operating simultaneously on tiers 2 and 3. Another 
frequent combination consists of supplementing one’s direct involvement in the supply chain by the 
manufacturing of spare parts. This is the case for 8.5% of tier 2 suppliers and 5.3% of tier 1 suppliers. 
6% of multi-tier suppliers intervene on tiers 1 and 2 and also manufacture spare parts. Lastly 10.7% 
of multi-tier companies (or 4.3% of all SMEs) operate on tiers 1, 2 and 3. 
Table 12 – Distribution of combinations for multi-tier suppliers  
Tiers occupied simultaneously   
Tiers 1 & 2  31.0% 
Tiers 2 & 3  29.2% 
Tiers 1 & 2 & 3  10.7% 
Tiers 2 & spare parts   8.5% 
Tiers 1 & 2 & spare parts  6.0% 
Tier 1 & spare parts   5.3% 
Other combinations (4 possibilities)  9.3% 
Total  100% 
Source: OSEO (2011) 
All in all, whereas a majority of SMEs taking part in the supply chain intervene on one single 
tier alone, it is important to avoid the conceptual trap that consists at this level of considering that 
the  pyramid  in  question  has  been  structured  once  and  for  all.  Crossover  possibilities  do  exist 
between different tiers. Many companies are simultaneously present on several different supply 
chain tiers.  Egyptian pyramid or Aztec pyramid: how should we describe the industrial architecture… 
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We have already demonstrated that size is an important element for explaining the tiers that 
SMEs occupy in the pyramid. We can, however, transcend this simple analysis by considering the 
nature of the services that suppliers offer. In the questionnaire, we asked suppliers to describe the 
services they fulfil on behalf of the automotive industry. These are qualified by two elements. Firstly, 
the characteristics of the elements provided (with engineering companies being eliminated from this 
database);  a  distinction  is  made  between  simple  and  complex  parts  (the  latter  defined  as 
subassemblies  derived  from  the  assembly  of  different  components).  We  then  asked  companies 
whether a research and/or development activity was involved. Combining the two, we were able to 
construct Table 13. 


















Simple parts  10.5%  15.6%  34.2%  17.3%  19.8%  2.5%  100% 
Complex parts  10.8%  26.2%  24.6%  21.5%  15.4%  1.5%  100% 
Simple parts + R&D  12.1%  31.2%  29.1%  17.7%  9.9%  0.0%  100% 
Complex parts+ R&D  21.0%  36.0%  24.0%  11.0%  7.0%  1.0%  100% 
Source: OSEO (2011) 
We retain two essential ideas at this level. The first is that, all things remaining equal, the more 
complex the service being provided, the greater the probability that the actor in question will be 
operating towards the top of the hierarchy. The first major distinction here is between complex and 
simple parts. The former tend to be made by suppliers positioned on the first tier. Adding R&D 
services increases the probability of becoming a tier 1 supplier, whether exclusively or partially. 
Conversely, suppliers manufacturing simple parts tend to be situated towards the bottom of the 
pyramid.  
The  word  “pyramid”  is  not  being  used  by  happenstance.  The  table  suggests  that  there  is 
indeed  a  form of  hierarchy  within  this  category of  SMEs.  What  we  find  here  is  more  or  less  a 
breakdown between the different kinds of logic underlying the pyramid architecture such as it was 
described in section 1 above. Nevertheless, the data also shows that: this pyramid is not totally 
grounded in a company size logic; carmakers continue to purchase simple components; and multi-
tier SMEs do in fact exist. 
The presence of these multi-tier companies can be explained by the fact that suppliers are able 
to  alternate  from  one  tier  or  contract  to  another.  Far  from  having  created  a  static  hierarchical 
structure, modularity perpetuates forms of rotation (Herrigel, 2010). One explanation lies in most 
products’ technical breakdown, which tends to be less stable than it first appears. L. Gadde and O. 
Jelbo (2002) have explained that carmakers vary greatly in the design of their vehicles’ physical 
breakdown. JJ. Chanaron (2001) agrees with this point and shows that the modularity approach 
adopted by Western carmakers differs from the path followed by their Japanese counterparts. In 
other  words,  it  is  the  chronic  instability  in  product  architecture  that  prevents  the  market  for 
components,  systems  and  modules  from  stabilising.  In  addition,  it  is  worth  noting  the  frequent 
disappointment of those equipment suppliers who wager on the modules market ever achieving a 
stable  structure  (Fourcade,  Midler,  2005)  –  they  have  often  had  to  re-orient  towards  kinds  of 
organisations allowing them to offer modules/macro-components even as they seek to maintain 
their status as components makers (Herrigel, 2010). Like the aerospace product (O’Sullivan, 2006), 
automotive interfaces are still very unstable and force carmakers to redefine their architectures from 
one model to another.  Egyptian pyramid or Aztec pyramid: how should we describe the industrial architecture… 
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Another  problem  derives from  the  internationalisation  of  production,  with  global  sourcing 
remaining a difficult point at this level. Sometimes, when the goal is to produce one and the same 
vehicle in different factories, carmakers are forced to adapt its elements either in reaction to the 
specificities of the local supplier fabric or else because they want to adapt to the local market, 
causing them in turn to restructure the equipment they demand (see Herrigel, 2010; Humphrey, 
Lecler, Salerno, 2000). A carmaker X embarked upon an internationalisation process has even been 
able to systematically re-design its general architecture and components in sync with its deployment 
of production overseas to such an extent that the outsourced elements have ended up being strongly 
differentiated from one country to another. Said carmaker does not rely systematically on mega-
suppliers engaged in a follow sourcing process. Some of the elements are sourced directly from 
smaller  companies  found  in  the  countries  where  its  plants  are  located  (Ref.  forthcoming  after 
authorisation).  
De facto, this pyramid representation is tantamount to an abbreviation. It is a metaphor where 
the automobile is depicted as an aggregation of different complex components that can themselves 
be broken down into subassemblies that are less complex in nature. Yet this quasi-fractal vision of 
things is only partially valid. It is true in the sense that efforts to modularise the automobile product 
have led to an amplification of this kind of branch structuring effort, epitomised by the creation of 
macro-components (Volpato, 2004) that are modules directly integrated into carmakers’ assembly 
lines. These result from an aggregation of different subassemblies that can themselves be broken 
down  into  elementary  components
14.  The  vision  is  imperfect,  however,  since  contrary  to  the 
description provided by the GM Vice President who stated that modular automobiles are “like the 
definition of a Lego set” (Financial Times, 28 January 2004, cited in Klier, Rubinstein, 2008, p.18), the 
automobile is not (yet) the same thing as a Lego set. As K. Pavitt notes (2003), we do not live in 
LegoLand. In addition to macro-components, many different elements and services are still being 
directly purchased by carmakers. In addition, the standardisation of components - notably when we 
think about the internationalisation of production - is still very imperfect. Things still have to be 
adapted. Given this double constraint, there is still room for SMEs to have direct access to carmakers. 
                                                      
14 In a study seeking to understand mega-suppliers’ location strategies, Frigant and Layan (2009) make a distinction between macro-




The purpose of this article has been to raise questions regarding the customary description of 
automotive supply chains’ industrial architecture. Analysis of transformations in supply chain since 
the 1980s has led to this architecture be represented using a pyramid image. With today’s focus on 
understanding the issues associated with transformations in this field of activity, we often end up 
describing a very hierarchical supply chain characterised by entirely hermetic tiers where companies 
throughout the pyramid are positioned by their size. It is true that this is an informative image that 
helps us to understand many ongoing processes. 
It remains that it is also a simplification that does not really stand up to the test of empirical 
analysis. As much as we consider it useful to employ the Egyptian pyramid metaphor, we also need 
to do better since it is a description that neglects far too many crucial realities.  
Firstly, it neglects important and crucial actors across the pyramid who can be subject to a 
great deal of pressure: large producers of raw materials and semi-transformed products as well as 
manufacturers of key components that can originally be very remote from the automotive business. 
Not  to  forget  the  engineering  companies  that  constitute  an  interface  between  carmakers  and 
suppliers and who owe much of their development to the rise of modularity.  
Secondly,  this metaphor  suggests  that  SMEs  are  condemned  to  fall  to  the  bottom  of  the 
pyramid because they do not have the means to operate on a global sourcing basis and cannot 
compete in the race to modularise. Clearly, a number of researchers (such as G. Herrigel back in 
2004)  have  contested  this  vision  but  questions  remain  whether  it  links  to  the  novelty  of  the 
modularisation process and whether, over time, SMEs might be drawn into an unavoidable decline. 
The  survey  of  SMEs  operating  in  different  supply  chains  has  provided  a  solid  empirical  proof 
corroborating Herrigel’s qualitative analysis. It confirms that certain SMEs retain direct access to 
carmakers and that the borders between the different tiers are not entirely hermetic. All in all, we 
want to keep this pyramid metaphor but feel that the industrial architecture of supply chains in 
Europe is more redolent of an Aztec pyramid than an Egyptian one. At the very least, it is less focused 
on a few mega-suppliers operating towards the top and features staircases along its sides that enable 
actors to ascend and descend easily depending on the relationships they entertain and the products 
they manufacture (Figure 3). 
Clearly, this whole undertaking remains a work in progress, first and foremost because we 
need to re-assess the role that large module suppliers play. The vocation of these actors may be to 
assume a tier 1 position but they might also intervene on tier 2, if only because they still have 
components divisions that can be mobilised by other suppliers who act as tier 1 actors where a 
particular  vehicle  is  concerned  (Herrigel,  2010).  This  whole  aspect  deserves  more  systematic 
research.  In  addition,  it might  be  beneficial  to  include  other  geographic  regions  in  the  analysis. 
Supply strategies vary depending from one carmaker to the next and it could be useful to study how 
they materialise in industrial architecture terms. The perspective chosen for this article - at least in 
section  2  -  is  fundamentally  supplier  focused.  This  could  be  reversed  so  that  questions  about 
architecture might be raised from carmakers’ perspective.  
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Figure 3 –Aztec pyramid 
 
Lastly, the analysis could also be extended to other sectors. After all, the automobile has often 
served as an ideas laboratory for other industries, and the same applies to the idea of a pyramid 
architecture. For instance, it is clear that aircraft manufacturers have also drawn inspiration from this 
principle when they began their vertical disintegration (Frigant, Talbot, 2005). The aircraft supply 
chains are nowadays described in relatively similar terms and the desire to structure suppliers into a 
tier  arrangement  recurs  in  many  observers’  narrative  (Kechidi,  Talbot,  2010;  Kechidi,  2008).  It 
remains that this similarity may also be only apparent. In addition, the complexity of the architecture 
displayed in the automobile sector may be solely based on the intrinsic limitations of carmaker’s 
desire to organise supply chains around modular mega-suppliers. The automotive industry might still 
have a few tricks to teach other industries. 
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